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Abstract
Background: Humans frequently engage in arbitrary, conventional behavior whose primary purpose is to identify with
cultural in-groups. The propensity for doing so is established early in human ontogeny as children become progressively
enmeshed in their own cultural milieu. This is exemplified by their habitual replication of causally redundant actions shown
to them by adults. Yet children seemingly ignore such actions shown to them by peers. How then does culture get
transmitted intra-generationally? Here we suggest the answer might be ‘in play’.
Principal Findings: Using a diffusion chain design preschoolers first watched an adult retrieve a toy from a novel apparatus
using a series of actions, some of which were obviously redundant. These children could then show another child how to
open the apparatus, who in turn could show a third child. When the adult modeled the actions in a playful manner they
were retained down to the third child at higher rates than when the adult seeded them in a functionally oriented way.
Conclusions: Our results draw attention to the possibility that play might serve a critical function in the transmission of
human culture by providing a mechanism for arbitrary ideas to spread between children.
Citation: Nielsen M, Cucchiaro J, Mohamedally J (2012) When the Transmission of Culture Is Child’s Play. PLoS ONE 7(3): e34066. doi:10.1371/
journal.pone.0034066
Editor: Alex Mesoudi, Queen Mary, University of London, United Kingdom
Received November 21, 2011; Accepted February 26, 2012; Published March 30, 2012
Copyright:  2012 Nielsen et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of the Australian Research Council (Discovery Project DP110100602) whose funding supported this
work. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
* E-mail: nielsen@psy.uq.edu.au
Introduction
When learning novel skills from adults children will replicate all
of the actions demonstrated to them, including those having no
apparent purpose or causal function [1–4]. An explanation for this
behavior is that when adults deliberately show them how to do
something children assume the adult has previously determined
the rationality and utility of the actions used and hence that the
demonstration is an attempt at teaching something relevant [5,6].
Adopting this attitude towards being taught relies on a perception
of knowledge disparity between teacher and learner, something
that is likely to be reduced when skills are to be transferred from
child to child [7]. It could therefore be reasonably expected that in
contrast to adult-child transmission the reproduction of redundant
actions would diminish or disappear in child-child transmission.
This is precisely what happens.
McGuigan and Graham [8] had 3- and 5-year-olds watch an
adult use a stick to retrieve a reward from a novel box after first
inserting the stick into the box at several different openings [9,10].
The child shown these actions was then given opportunity to act
on the apparatus in front another child who had not seen the
original demonstration. The second child could then demonstrate
to a third and so on down chains 8 children long. For one group of
children the box was opaque and hence the consequences of each
insertion into the box could not be easily determined [4]. For a
second group the box was transparent, making it obvious that
when the stick was inserted into a hole at the top it struck an
internal barrier and made no contact with that part of the
apparatus from which the sticker was taken. This action was
clearly redundant. When the box was opaque all children in the
chain maintained the redundant stick insertion. Whereas the 3-
year-olds transmitted the irrelevant actions whether the box was
opaque or transparent, by the second child the 5-year-olds had
omitted the redundant actions when the box was transparent. This
shift from incorporating to omitting redundant actions with age is
in stark contrast to adult-child scenarios whereby a tendency to
over-imitate increases with age [11,12].
The strong propensity for children to absorb and repeat the
behaviors of adults is argued to be fundamental to the proliferation
of cultural practices and traditions [13–15]. This is especially true
of the arbitrary, conventional skills that individuals use to identify
with and align themselves with their cultural in-group. However
culture is not only transmitted vertically, from generation to
generation, but also horizontally, within generations [16]. How
can this happen if children do not readily take on irrelevant aspects
of their peers’ behavior? The answer might be ‘by playing’. When
children play together they often make up the content of what they
are doing as they go. The use of objects can be refined and re-
described as becomes necessary, with their functions assigned
purely by virtue of collective agreement [17]. These objects thus
attain what are called ‘status functions’ [18] and they are a pivotal
component of any human culture (e.g., a piece of paper with a
number and a pretty picture is currency only because the people
who use it agree so). Moreover, from play pretending grows, and it
is in this exercise of the child’s imagination that insight into the
minds of others may be fostered [19–22]. As play, and especially
pretense, commonly consists of rules that exist purely because the
players agree they ‘‘exist’’ it provides a realm in which the intra-
generational transfer of cultural ideas can take hold [23,24].
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by McGuigan and Graham [8]. Preschoolers first watched an
adult demonstrate how to use an object to retrieve a toy from a
novel box. She did this by slowly and deliberately performing a
sequence of causally irrelevant disconnected actions (i.e., those that
neither touch the box nor open it) and causally irrelevant
connected actions (those which directly contact the box yet still
do not open it). Both action forms were employed as it has been
shown that young children are less inclined to copy disconnected
actions than connected actions [1]. Following demonstration of
these redundant actions the adult placed the object to a switch
located on the front of the box in a manner that resulted in it being
opened. In one condition children saw the actions modeled in a
functional manner typical of contemporary imitation research; in
another condition the actions were demonstrated playfully. The
children who saw these demonstrations were then given
opportunity to pass this information on to another child who in
turn could pass it on to a third child. If play enables the arbitrary
behaviors that characterize human culture to be transferred
between children the redundant actions should be maintained in
the playful chains at a higher rate than the functional chains. We
also included a No Demonstration Control condition in which the
first child in each chain was given a box to explore but was not
given any information on how to open it nor on how to use the
object that came with it. This provided a point of comparison to
check that the redundant actions are unlikely to be exhibited
without being modeled first.
Further, psychology as a discipline has been criticized for
focusing data collection on an overly limited sample of the world’s
population [25,26]. To this end we undertook testing in two
distinct cultural communities: Brisbane, Australia and Colombo,
Sri Lanka. As over-imitation has been established in distinct
cultural groups [11] and play is considered a human universal
[27,28] we predicted that children would respond similarly,
irrespective of their cultural heritage. Regardless, this approach
enables data collection from a more heterogeneous sample than
would arise if only one community were sampled.
Results
As predicted, preliminary analyses revealed that there were no
significant differences in the responses of the Brisbane and
Colombo children across any of the dependent variables. All
subsequent analyses were thus conducted collapsed across
communities. Further, regardless of chain position, for each
condition there were no significant differences in children’s
production of the disconnected and connected actions or in their
success opening the boxes. Thus, in order to increase statistical
power data was collapsed to form one overall measure where a
score of 7 indicates perfect replication of the adults initial
demonstration (3 disconnected actions+3 connected actions+suc-
cessful box opening).
First Child in Chain
The first step in the primary analysis was to establish whether or
not social learning of the actions from the modeling adult
occurred. Demonstrating that it had, a one-way ANOVA with
condition (Playful, Functional, No Demonstration) as the between-
groups factor and overall score as the dependent variable was
significant, F (2, 25)=177.99, p,.001, partial g
2=.93 (see
Figure 1). Although 7 of the 8 children in the No Demonstration
Control condition were able to work out how to open the boxes
without demonstration, none exhibited either the connected or
disconnected actions, resulting in a close to floor score (M=.88,
SD=.35). Conversely, children in the Functional and Playful
conditions produced the actions with high levels of fidelity
(M=6.00, SD=1.05 and M=6.80, SD=.42 respectively).
Reflecting these differences, Tukey HSD post-hoc tests indicated
that children in the No Demonstration Control condition
replicated fewer actions than children in either the Functional or
Playful conditions (p,.001 for both), with children in the Playful
condition also producing significantly more actions than those in
the Functional condition (p=.046).
Retention Through Chains
Having established that children first in the Functional and
Playful chains had socially learned the actions the next step was to
evaluate whether the actions were transmitted at different rates
through the chains. In order to do this, a repeated-measures
ANOVA was run with Condition (Playful, Functional, No
Demonstration) as a between-subjects factor and Chain Position
(First, Second, Third) as a within-subjects factor. The main effects
for Condition and Chain Position were significant, F (2,
25)=35.22, p,.001, partial g
2=.74, and F (2, 50)=36.81,
p,.001, partial g
2=.60 respectively. Critically, indicating differ-
ent rates of retention, the Condition X Chain Position interaction
was also significant, F (4, 50)=10.64, p,.001, partial g
2=.46.
The First Child in Chain analysis reported above revealed
condition-based differences in children’s responses to the adult
model. To further clarify the Condition X Chain Position
interaction a series of post-hoc independent-samples t-tests were
conducted comparing the responses of children in each condition
at the second and third positions of each chain. At the second
position in the chain children in the No Demonstration Control
condition produced significantly fewer actions (M=.88, SD=.35)
than children in the Functional condition [M=3.30, SD=2.06,
t(16)=3.28, p=.005], and children in the Playful condition
[M=5.00, SD=2.00), t(16)=5.73, p,.001]. The difference
between children in the Functional and Playful conditions
approached significance, t(18)=1.87, p=.077.
For children at the third position, those in the Playful condition
produced significantly more actions (M=4.20, SD=2.15) than
children in either the Functional condition [M=1.50, SD=1.43,
t(18)=3.30, p=.004], or children in the No Demonstration
Control condition [M=.88, SD=.35, t(16)=4.30, p=.001].
There was no difference between children in the Functional and
No Demonstration Control conditions, t(16)=1.20, p=.249.
Thus, in contrast to those in the Playful condition, by the third
generation, children in the Functional condition were no longer
producing the target actions at rates distinct from those who were
not exposed to them in the beginning.
Discussion
Children have been consistently shown to copy all of the actions
used by an adult when solving a novel task, even when the acts
clearly have no causal relevance to the demonstrated outcome and
even when they may actually compromise success. And they have
been demonstrated to do so from early in ontogeny, in atypically
developing populations and from wide-ranging cultural groups
(notably, the current study extends over-imitation to another
cultural group) [2,11,29]. This over-imitation behavior has been
viewed as an expression of the human cultural mind; a mind that
must be able to quickly acquire the skills for engaging with a
multitude of objects and tools while simultaneously assimilating the
traditions of relevant social in-groups [24,30,31]. However, as
exemplified by their responses in diffusion chain studies, children
do not readily over-imitate peer models [8–10,12,32]. Over-
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transmission of cultural information, but not for horizontal
transmission.
We reasoned that the previously demonstrated lack of children’s
over-imitation of other children might be attributable to the nature
of the initial adult demonstration. That is, when an adult seeds the
target action in the first child it is typically done in a serious,
pedagogical manner. This might facilitate adult-child transmission
[6,33–35] but not subsequent child-child transmission; especially if
children have little or no reason to view their peer model as an
expert [7,36,37]. In contrast, when playing children will
unhesitatingly adopt the non-functional, arbitrary actions and
behaviors of their playmates. We thus hypothesized that
redundant actions would be more likely to filter down diffusion
chains if originally modeled in a playful rather than a serious way.
This hypothesis was supported.
Although there was some deterioration in the exhibition of the
irrelevant target actions from the first to the third child in both
experimental conditions, the loss was greater for children in the
Functional condition. Indeed, by the third child in each Playful
chain, 8 of 10 children still exhibited at least one of the
disconnected actions and 7 children exhibited at least one of the
connected actions. In stark contrast only 2 children in the
Functional condition produced a disconnected action and only 2
produced a connected action (1 child did both – i.e., 7 of 10
children produced neither disconnected nor connected irrelevant
actions). Framing the initial demonstration as ‘playful’ thus
appears to facilitate the retention and transmission of redundant
actions. A limitation of this work is that we did not directly code
children’s behavior when interacting with each other, and hence
we cannot unequivocally claim that a playful attitude facilitated
transmission of the irrelevant actions. Future research is thus
needed to definitively establish what aspects of child-child
interaction lead to irrelevant actions being passed on and adopted.
According to the contact principle mechanical interactions
cannot occur at a distance, something that even very young infants
are sensitive to. Because they are less likely to be misinterpreted as
having a casual connection to the target outcome, Lyons et al. [1]
predicted that rates of over-imitation would diminish for actions
violating this principle. In line with their prediction, 4-year-olds
were found to produce irrelevant actions on one half of a puzzle
box at lower rates when it was physically separated from the
second half of the box where a toy could be retrieved from,
compared with when both halves were connected. We thus
expected disconnected actions would more prone to extinction
than connected actions. This did not happen within each
experimental condition, where children at each point in the
chains were no more likely to produce the disconnected than
connected actions. This contrast between the current study and
Lyons et al. may be attributable to procedural differences. In
Lyons et al. the disconnected actions were performed on an object
separated from the apparatus that the target object could be
retrieved from. In the current study the disconnected actions were
performed in the empty space surrounding the apparatus. As our
study was not explicitly designed to investigate the differential
effect of disconnected and connected actions, precisely why this
procedural change had the effect it did is unclear. Exploring this
issue is a matter for future research.
It is also notable that in order to emphasize their non-serious
nature and to circumvent the need for narrative to be transmitted
as well as actions, children in the Playful condition were given toy
objects whereas those in the Functional condition were not. It is
thus possible that the results we report are attributable to the
different objects used. However, this seems unlikely. Half of the
children in the no demonstration control condition were given one
of the playful objects to use; yet not one of these children
spontaneously produced any of the irrelevant actions. Nonetheless,
by virtue of their very nature, the car and cow have pre-established
affordances as play objects and this could have primed children’s
reactions. Future research is thus needed to determine if children
will respond in the same way as those in the current study if they
are modeled playful actions on unfamiliar, ambiguous objects.
It has been argued that children acquire new skills and
behaviors by copying adults and older peers who are perceived
Figure 1. Mean number (and standard error) of total actions reproduced across conditions (Playful, Functional, No Model) at each
step in the chains (First, Second, Third).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034066.g001
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‘zone of proximal development’ children’s abilities are thus
scaffolded to a new level. In this context it makes sense that
children are more inclined to adopt novel, ostensibly functional,
actions from a ‘more competent’ adult than a same-aged peer. In
contrast, children’s play commonly features the enthusiastic
creation of arbitrary rules and rituals where the direct conse-
quences of actions are markedly diminished or absent (‘spilling’ a
pretend ‘cup of tea’ onto the carpet is less likely to incur the rancor
of one’s parents than spilling actual tea; missing a lion with an
arrow is considerably less dangerous if the ‘lion’ is a tree). Entering
into playful games with peers is much more about engaging with
others than it is about acquiring object-related skills. When
confronted with a peer whose seemingly irrelevant actions are
couched as play behavior, adopting the actions becomes more
about social interaction and less about skill acquisition. There is a
greater chance, then, that redundant actions will be passed on.
The notion that play serves to place irrelevant actions in a social
frame has wider implications for existing views on over-imitation.
It has been argued that this phenomenon stems from a motivation
to be like and be liked by others [39,40] and from the assumption
that unnecessary actions ought to be performed as part of a
learned behavioral norm [3,41]. Whereas these perspectives can
account for the transmission of redundant actions in the playful
condition introduced here, they fail to explain their lack of uptake
in the functional condition. Others posit that over-imitation arises
from confusion about the causal relations between actions and
their outcomes [42] or that it is an evolved heuristic for learning
about causally opaque cultural artifacts [30]. These less socially
oriented interpretations can explain why children adopt redundant
actions modeled by an assumedly knowledgeable adult but ignore
them when shown by an inexpert peer model. However, neither
theory, without elaboration, provides a reason for the transmission
of irrelevant actions in the playful condition. Though the
phenomenon can be traced back to earlier work [43], the term
‘over-imitation’ and research devoted to dissecting it are only half
a decade old [1]. It is nonetheless a striking behavior. Indeed the
proclivity shown by both young children and adults to adopt
obviously irrelevant components of a model’s demonstration is
seemingly incongruous with the early development of a capacity
for selective imitation [39,44]. Prolonged debate regarding the
nature of this new social learning puzzle can thus be expected.
What the current data indicate is that finding a broad coverall
explanation for the ways over-imitation gets expressed is likely to
prove challenging.
Children often incorporate elements of the lives of the adults
around them when they play: That is, they bring part of their
culture in [28]. Here we show how play may not only do this but
that it can also enable cultural ideas, in the form of arbitrary
actions, to spread from child to child. It remains to be firmly
established whether play does so because of the special nature of
the social interactions that it consists of [17,23,24], because it is in
play exchanges that a theory of mind takes hold [19–22], or
because of some other as yet unidentified reason. Regardless, in
order for any behavior to be considered ‘cultural’ it must
propagate in a social group. Scholars of cultural evolution have
thus emphasized the roles of imitation and teaching in facilitating
the emergence and spread of habits and traditions [6,13,14,15].
The status of play as a cultural transmission device has received far
less attention [17,24,45]. Yet unless evidence is mustered to
suggest child-child interaction has little to do with the spread of
cultural ideas, play may yet prove to be equally necessary and
worthy of increasing research focus.
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
The participants’ parents provided written informed consent
and the Behavioural & Social Science Ethical Review Committee
of the University of Queensland specifically approved this study
(Application #2009001642).
Participants
Forty-two children (24 boys) aged between 4 and 5 years
(M=53.5 months; SD=3.4 months; Range=48 months to 59
months) from Brisbane, Australia participated in this study. All
children tested were White and lived in metropolitan suburbs
surrounding a large university. An additional two children were
tested but excluded from the data set as a result of experimenter
error. Both were first in No Demonstration control condition
chains. Other children who subsequently served as the first child in
the relevant chains replaced these children. Forty-two (21 boys)
similarly aged children (M=54.1 months; SD=5.8 months;
Range=41 months to 66 months) from Colombo, Sri Lanka also
participated. Almost all the Sri Lankan children were Sri Lankan,
an island that classifies as part of the South Asian subcontinent.
Three children were of Indian origin, and one child was half
White but had lived in Sri Lanka for most of her life.
Children were randomly allocated to one of three conditions: 15
from each cultural group to a Functional condition, 15 to a Playful
condition, and 12 to a No-model control condition. This resulted
in 10 chains of 3 children for each of the main experimental
conditions and 8 chains of 3 children for the control condition.
Residents native to each city conducted all testing.
Apparatus
Two similar opaque wooden boxes (19.5 cm612.5 cm66.5 cm)
were used (see Figure 2). Each contained a hidden toy that could
be obtained by releasing a switch mechanism located on the front
of the box. For one box the switch had to be pushed inwards, for
the other box the switch had to be slid from right to left. The use of
the boxes was counterbalanced across conditions. Four objects
were also used (see Figure 2); two for the Functional condition – a
black wooden stick and a large metal key (for reasons beyond our
control this had to be replaced by a teaspoon for the Colombo
testing), and two for the Playful condition – a toy cow and a toy car.
It was necessary to use different objects across conditions in order
to emphasize the playful nature of the latter while avoiding the
need for verbal descriptions to be passed from child to child of
what the objects were or how they were to be employed. The
Figure 2. The boxes and objects used in this experiment.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034066.g002
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respective conditions.
Procedure
All children were tested in a quiet area of their childcare center
away from any activities or other children. Children were
randomly allocated to one of three conditions. Across all
conditions the adult acted in a warm and friendly way, engaging
the children with appropriate levels of eye contact.
Functional condition. Child A (the first child in the diffusion
chain) was asked to sit to the side of the adult demonstrator so that
both were facing one of the boxes. The demonstrator took the
object associated with the box and said ‘watch me and then you can
have a go’. She then slowly and deliberately performed one of two
distinct sequences (counterbalanced across boxes and conditions)
of irrelevant disconnected actions and irrelevant connected actions
(Sequence 1: slide the object on the ground surrounding the box,
three times, in a semi-circular pattern then slide the object across
the lid of the box, from left to right, three times; Sequence 2: slide the
object across the ground behind the box, moving from left to right
three times then tap the object three times across the top of the
box, moving from left to right). This was followed by the action
that disengaged the hidden mechanism and opened the box.
When the adult performed the actions she included verbalizations
that were either descriptive or were intended to echo the sounds
being made by the object (e.g., for the stick saying ‘‘slide, slide,
slide’’ when it was being wiped on the ground surrounding the box
and ‘‘swoop, swoop, swoop’’ when being slid across the box’s lid;
for the key saying ‘‘skoot, skoot, skoot’’ when sliding it across the
ground behind the box and ‘tap, tap, tap’ when hitting it on the
box’s lid). Her actions were modeled in a way that was intended to
engage the child via ostensive communicative cues [33] involving
direct eye contact and performance of the target actions in a
deliberate, structured manner. Once the box was opened, the toy
was removed and shown to the child. After this sequence was
repeated the object was placed beside the closed box and the child
was told ‘now it’s your turn’. If necessary the child was given generic
prompts (e.g. ‘‘go on, you can do it’’ and ‘‘you can do what ever
you want’’). This phase was terminated when the child either
opened the box or after 10 minutes had expired.
After Child A had opened the box, regardless of the means used,
Child B was brought into the test area and told to wait while the
first child had a second attempt at opening the box. No explicit
instructions were given to either child about teaching or imitating,
and the experimenter ensured that each child had a clear view of
the box, the object, and the actions being performed. After Child
A had finished demonstrating, he/she left the test area and Child
B was given the box and object and told ‘now it’s your turn’ as per
Child A. This procedure continued through to the third and final
child.
Playful condition. This general procedure for this condition
was identical to the Functional Condition. However, the action
sequences shown to Child A were performed by the adult using
one of the two play objects. The actions themselves were also
modeled emphasizing their playful manner, incorporating
knowing looks and smiles [46,47] and including verbalizations
typically made with such objects (for the car saying ‘whoosh,
whoosh, whoosh’ for one sequence of actions and ‘vroom, vroom,
vroom’ for the other sequence; for the cow saying ‘moo, moo,
‘moo’ for one sequence of actions and ‘gobble (as if eating), gobble,
gobble’ for the other).
No demonstration control condition. Child A was shown
the box and associated object, and was told, ‘lots of boys and girls have
had a go, and now it’s your turn’. Children were then allowed to
manipulate the box as they wished until they either opened the
box or after 10 minutes expired. When Child B was brought in
Child A was asked to demonstrate ‘what you can do with it’.
Coding and Reliability
There were three dependent variables for each box: (1) the
frequency with which each child produced the disconnected
irrelevant actions; (2) the frequency with which each child
produced the connected irrelevant actions; and (3) whether or
not the box was opened. For the Brisbane children, responses were
coded from video recorded during each session. A second
observer, blind to the aims and hypotheses of the study and to
the child’s condition, independently coded a chain from each
condition (i.e., 9 children). There was 100% agreement across
raters for all dependent measures. We were unable to obtain
ethical approval to video the children in Colombo. Coding was
therefore conducted in real time by two observers (the third author
and a volunteer research assistant). Inter-observer agreement was
high for each dependent measure: for disconnected irrelevant
actions Cohen’s k=.81; for connected irrelevant actions k=.80;
and for box opening Cohen’s k=.95. As the more experienced of
the two coders, data was subsequently based on that taken by the
third author.
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